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Abstract
We propose a bit-oriented quantum public-key scheme which uses Boolean
function as private-key and randomly changed pairs of quantum state and
classical string as public-keys. Contrast to the typical classical public-key
scheme, one private-key in our scheme corresponds to an exponential number
of public-keys. The goal of our scheme is to achieve information-theoretic
security, and the security analysis is also given.
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1. Introduction
Public-key encryption (PKE) is one of the important branches of cryptog-
raphy, and has been widely applied into various fields. Classical public-key
encryption is based on one-way function with the hardness of solving the
computational difficult problem. Since the investigation to quantum Tur-
ing machine was started and Shor’s algorithm as well as Grover’s algorithm
were put forward, quantum public-key encryption (QPKE) emerged as times
require.
According to whether the encrypted messages and keys are in quantum
states or not, we classify QPKE into four types. The first type is that
∗Corresponding author email: yangli@iie.ac.cn
messages and keys are both classical. The Knapsack-based scheme[1] pro-
posed by Okamato uses classical key to encrypt and to decrypt classical
messages, but the participants are all quantum probabilitic polynomial Tur-
ing machine. The second type encrpts quantum messages with classical keys.
The McEliece QPKE scheme proposed in [2] was belong to this type. This
scheme was based on a classical NP-complete problem related with finding
a code word of a given weight in a linear binary code. With this foudation,
Yang et al. [3] gave the definition of induced trapdoor one-way quantum
function. Fujita[4] also constructed McEliece QPKE relied on the difficulty
of NPC problem. The third type refers to classical messages and quan-
tum keys. Gottesman and Chuang [5] were the first to construct quantum
states as public-keys. Kawachi[6, 7] investigated the cryptographic property
”computational indistinguishability” of two quantum states generated via
fully flipped permutations and proposed a QPKE based on it. Nikolopou-
los [8] constructed a QPKE from the perspective of single-qubit rotation
and trapdoor one-way function. [9] also proposed a information-theoretic se-
cure QPKE designed with conjugate coding single-photon string. The fourth
is with quantum messages and quantum keys. Gottesman [10] proposed a
QPKE based on teleportation with information-theoretic security. Liang et
al. [11] combined the basic idea of [12] and quantum perfect encryption to
construct an information-theoretically secure QPKE. Kawachi and Pormann
[13] presented another kind of quantum message-oriented public-key encryp-
tion protocol with quantum public-key, but they show this scheme is bounded
information-theoretic secure.
In this paper, we invetigate the way to construct bit-oriented public-key
encryption scheme. Firstly, we overview some definition about information-
theoretically security about QPKE and quantum perfect encryption. Second,
we present a new bit-oriental public-key encryption scheme. Finally, we
investigate the scheme’s security against attack to the key and attack to the
encryption and prove that the scheme is information-theoretically secure.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Information-theoretic security
Goldreich [14] defined the ciphertext indistinguishability in classical PKE:
for every polynomial-size circuit family cn, every positive polynomial p(·), all
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sufficiently large n, and every x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗, satisfies:∣∣∣Pr [Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr [Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(y)) = 1]∣∣∣ < 1
p(n)
. (1)
Similar to the ciphertext indistinguishability in classical context, [15] extend
the concept to QPKE and presented the definition of information-theoretic
quantum ciphertext-indistinguishability for public-key encryption of classical
messages:
Definition 1. A quantum public-key encryption scheme of classical messages
is information-theoretically ciphertext-indistinguishable, if for every quantum
circuit family {Cn}, every positive polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n,
and any two bit-string x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗, satisfies:∣∣∣Pr [Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr [Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(y)) = 1]∣∣∣ < 1
p(n)
(2)
where G is key generation algorithm, E is a quantum encryption algorithm,
and the ciphertext E(x), E(y) are quantum states.
[15] also proved that a quantum public-key encryption scheme is information-
theoretically secure if the trace distance between any two cihpertexts is
O( 1
2n
), and Eq. (1) holds.
Definition 2. For all plaintext x and y, let the density operators of ciphertext
E(x) and E(y) be ρx and ρy respectively. A quantum public-key encryption
scheme is said to be information-theoretically secure, if for every positive
polynomial p(·) and every sufficiently large n, satisfies:
D(ρx, ρy) <
1
p(n)
(3)
2.2. Quantum perfect encryption
Assume a set of oeprations Uk, each Uk is a 2
n × 2n unitary matrix. The
ciphertext state of n-qubit quantum message ρ is ρC . k refers to private-key,
each k is chosen with probability pk. To encrypt, applying Uk to ρ:
ρc = UkρU
†
k (4)
The private-key owner can use U †k to decrypt:
ρ = U †kρUk (5)
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As defined in [16]: for every input state ρ, the output state is an ultimately
mixed state: ∑
k
pkUkρU
+
k =
I
2
. (6)
That is:
{pk = 122n , Uk = Uα1 Uβ2 , k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} is a quantum perfect
encryption, where Uk = U
α
1 U
β
2 constitute a complete orthogonal basis.
2.3. Simple description of QPKE in [12]
The QPKE in [12] consists of three phases: key generation, encryption
and decryption.
Suppose that Ωn = {k ∈ Z2n|WH(k) is odd}, Πn = {k ∈ Z2n |WH(k) is even}.
WH denotes the hamming weight of k. In this scheme defined two n-qubit
states:
ρ0k,i =
1
2
(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉)(〈i|+ 〈i⊕ k|) (7)
and
ρ1k,i =
1
2
(|i〉 − |i⊕ k〉)(〈i| − 〈i⊕ k|), (8)
where i ∈ Z2n, k ∈ Ωn.
[Key Generation]
1. Bob randomly selects a Boolean Function as his private-key from the
mapping set F : {0, 1}m 7→ {0, 1}n, and also chooses a bit string s,
s ∈ Z2m ;
2. Bob computes F (s) = k, and then prepares quantum state ρ0k,i accord-
ing to the string k ∈ Ωn, i ∈ Z2n ;
3. Bob sends his public-key (s, ρ0k,i) to the public register.
[encryption]
1. Ailce download Bob’s public-key from the public register;
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2. if she wants to send message ”0”, she sends (s, ρ0k,i) to Bob; if the
message is ”1”, she does Z⊗n on ρ0k,i to acquire ρ
1
k,i, then sends (s, ρ
1
k,i)
to Bob.
[decryption]
1. Receiving the message send from Alice, Bob uses his private-key F to
compute F (S) = k;
2. Using a bit ”1” in k as controlled bit to do CONT operation to other
bits in the quantum state, then measuring the quantum state with basis
{|+〉, |−〉} to get the message.
2.4. Attack method
[9] presented an effective attack for the scheme descrpted in 2.4. The
concrete steps are as follows:
1. when an attacker gets user’s public-key (s, ρ0k,i), he does random Hadamard
transform to the quantum state ρ0k,i:
H⊗n[
1√
2
(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉)] = 1√
2n+1
∑
y
((−1)y·i|y〉+ (−1)y·(i⊕k)|y〉)
=
1√
2n+1
∑
y
(−1)y·i(1 + (−1)y·k)|y〉 (9)
2. Attacker measures |y〉, and gets y0.
y0 satisfies y0 ·k = 0. That is to say, it satisfies the equation y0 ·F (s) = 0.
The Boolean function is n-input and n-output, it can be expressed as:
F (s) = (F (1)(s), . . . , F (n)(s)) (10)
The minor term expression of every F (i)(s) is:
F (j)(s) = (s
aj11
1 · . . . · saj1nn )⊕ . . .⊕ (s
ajp(n)1
1 · . . . · sajp(n)nn ) (11)
Since that xa = xa⊕ a⊕ 1, we rewrite the Boolean function in linear expres-
sion:
F (j)(s) =
p(n)⊕
α=1
(
n∏
β=1
(sβajαβ + ajαβ + 1)) (12)
So the attacker gets the equation about F (s), he will be able to acquire
information about user’s private-key F .
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3. bit-oriented public-key encryption
3.1. preparition of quantum state
Firstly, we take into account how to construct the quantum state used in
this scheme. The quantum state is ρ0k:
ρ0k =
1
2
(|0〉+ |k〉)(〈0|+ 〈k|) (13)
The concrete steps of preparing quantum state ρ0k is as follows:
1. Prepare quantum state |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 and two quantum registers. Applying
Hadamard transform to the first register, the state of the whole system
becomes:
(H ⊗ I⊗n)(|0〉 ⊗ |0〉) = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
⊗ |0〉 (14)
2. Define controlled-k operator Ck as: Ck|0〉|0〉 = |0〉|0〉, Ck|1〉|0〉 = |1〉|k〉,
Ck can be realized via a group of CNOT operations. We get the state:
1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|k〉) (15)
3. Use one of the non-zero bits in k to do CNOT to the first register, then
obtain:
1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |0〉|k〉) (16)
Finally, we get the state ρ0k,i.
ρ1k,i can be obtained by applying Z
⊗n on ρ0k,i.
Remark 1. There is another way to prepare ρ0k,i:
1. prepare n-qubit quantum state |0〉, and select the jth qubit ”0j” which
at the same time satisfies kj = 1 in |0〉 to do Hadamard transform:
|01, . . . , 0j−1〉( |0j〉+ |1j〉√
2
)|0j+1, . . . , 0n〉,
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2. use all the ”1” in k to do CNOT on the above quantum state, we
acquire:
1√
2
(|0〉+ |k〉).
Compared with the previous one, this method is more efficient because of
that the total number of CNOT operation decreased by two.
3.2. detail description of bit-oriented public-key encryption
Let k1 ∈ Ωn, k1 = {k11, . . . , k1n}, k2 = {k21, . . . , k2n} and k3 = {k31, . . . , k3n}
are bit strings, where each element is in {0, 1}. We denote H⊗k = Hk1 ⊗
· · · ⊗Hkn, where H0 = I, H1 = H . The definition is similar with Y ⊗k
[Key Generation]
1. Bob selects randomly two Boolean function F = (F1, F2, F3) from
F : {0, 1}m 7→ {0, 1}n as his private-key, and also chooses two string
s = (s1, s2, s3) randomly from the set {0, 1}m to do the computation
F1(s1) = k1, F2(s2) = k2, F3(s3) = k3 to get k = (k1, k2, k3). If k1 /∈ Ωn,
Bob selects s1 again until k1 ∈ Ωn;
2. Bob uses k1 to prepare quantum state ρ
0
k1
,and then does Hadamard
transform on ρ0k1 to get the quantum part of public-key according to
k2:
ρ0F (s) =
1
2
Y ⊗k3H⊗k2(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|)H⊗k2Y ⊗k3 (17)
3. Bob stores (s, ρ0F (s)) in the quantum registers as his public-key.
[encryption]
1. Alice downloads Bob’s public-key from quantum registers;
2. if Alice wants to send message 0, she sends (s, ρ0F (s)) to Bob; if she
sends 1, she does transform as bellow:
ρ1F (s) = Y
⊗nρ0F (s)(Y
⊗n)†
=
1
2
Y ⊗nY ⊗k3H⊗k2(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|)H⊗k2Y ⊗k3Y ⊗n
=
1
2
Y ⊗k3H⊗k2(|1〉+ (−1)p(k1)|k1〉)(〈1|+ (−1)p(k1)〈k1|)H⊗k2Y ⊗k3
=
1
2
Y ⊗k3H⊗k2(|1〉 − |k1〉)(〈1| − 〈k1|)Y ⊗k3H⊗k2, (18)
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where the length of n is even,
3. Alice sends (s, ρ1F (s)) to Bob;
[Decryption]
1. Bob uses s = (s1, s2, s3) and F = (F1, F2, F3) to compute k = (k1, k2, k3);
2. Bob uses k2, k3 to remove transforms on the ciphertext state ρ
b
F (s):
ρbk = (Y
⊗k3H⊗k2)†ρbF (s)Y
⊗k3H⊗k2 (19)
3. Bob sums the 2th and nth qubit to the first component. If the trans-
mitted message is 0, the quantum state becomes: |01, 02, . . . , 0n〉 +
|11, k2, . . . , kn〉, and then he uses the first bit in the second component
|k1〉 as controlled bit to do CNOT operation to other bits in this state:
|01, 02, . . . , 0n〉 + |11, 02, . . . , 0n〉. If the transmitted message is 1, the
quantum state after operation is: |01, 12, . . . , 1n〉 − |11, k2, . . . , kn〉, and
takes the first bit in k1 as controlled bit to do CNOT operation to other
bits to get the state: |01, 02, . . . , 0n〉−|11, 02, . . . , 0n〉. Finally, Bob mea-
sures the quantum state with basis {|+〉, |−〉} to get the message.
Remark 2. The Boolean function F can be generated efficiently. For the
m-input, n-output F = (F (1)(s), . . . , F (n)(s)), each output F (i)(s) has p(n)
terms. The minor term expression of every F (i)(s) is:
F (j)(s) = (s
aj11
1 · . . . · saj1nn )⊕ . . .⊕ (s
ajp(n)1
1 · . . . · s
ajp(n)n
n ). (20)
Each term s
ajα1
1 · . . .·sajαnn can be determined by n times of coin tossing. If we
toss the coin for np(n) times, p(n) components are determined. Therefore,
the Boolean function F will be efficiently generated by n2p(n) times of coin
tossing.
4. Security analysis
The security of the bit-oriental quantum public-key encryption scheme
proposed above is analyzed from two aspects: (1) the security of private-key;
(2) the security of encryption.
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4.1. security of private key
The quantum part of public-key is ρ0F (s). Since the adversary has no
idea of private-key F = (F1, F2, F3), the public-key state for him is ρ
0 =∑
F
pFρ
0
F (s). The specific expression of ρ
0
F (s) is:
ρ0F (S) = Y
⊗k3H⊗k2
[1
2
(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|)
]
H⊗k2Y ⊗k3. (21)
Thus, we have:
ρ0 =
∑
F
pFρ
0
F (s)
=
1
22n
∑
k2,k3
Y ⊗k3H⊗k2
[ 1
2n
∑
k1
(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|)
]
H⊗k2Y ⊗k3
=
1
22n
∑
k2,k3
Y ⊗k3H⊗k2ρ(Y ⊗k3H⊗k2)†, (22)
where
ρ =
1
2n
∑
k1
(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|). (23)
Since k1 ∈ {0, 1}n, the possibilities of the value of k1 is 2n. The Boolean
function F1(s1) has n-output, and each output has p(n) terms, so n
2p(n)
times coin tossing will determine F1(s1). n
2p(n) times coin tossing has 2n
2p(n)
possibilities. The possibilities of F1(s1) is 2
nnp(n)−n times of that of k1. So the
output of private-key F1(s1) iterates over all the possible value of k1. (k2, F2)
and (k3, F3) is the same case as (k1, F1).
Before demonstrate the quantum state of ρ0 is an ultimately mixed state,
we firstly prove: {pk = 122n , Uk = Y αHβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} is a
quantum perfect encryption.
Proof. {Y αHβ, α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} is complete orthogonal basis, therefore any n-
qubit state can be expressed as a linear combination of 2n unitary matrices:
ρ =
∑
α,β
aα,βY
αHβ, (24)
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where
aα,β =
1
2n
tr(ρHβY α), (25)
1
2n
tr(
∑
α,β
aα,βY
αHβHδY γ)
=
1
2n
tr(aα,β +
∑
γ 6=α or δ 6=β
(−1)(δ⊕β)·γY α+γHβ+δ). (26)
In the above equation is either α 6= γ or β 6= δ, moreover, tr(Y ) = 0,
tr(H) = 0, so tr
( ∑
γ 6=α or δ 6=β
(−1)α2+γ2+(δ⊕β)·γY α+γHβ+δ) = 0.
1
2n
tr(
∑
α,β
aα,βY
αHβHδY γ) =
1
2n
aα,β (27)
∑
k
pkUkρU
†
k =
1
22n
∑
γ,δ
Y γHδρHδY γ
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
Y γHδY αHβHδY γ
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
(−1)α·δY αY γHδ(−1)β·γHδY γHβ
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
(−1)α·δ(−1)β·γY αHβ, (28)
because of 1
2n
∑
γ∈{0,1}n
(−1)β·γ = δβ,0,
∑
k
pkUkρU
†
k is as bellow:
∑
t
pkUkρU
†
k =
∑
α,β
aα,βδα,0δβ,0Y
αHβ
= a00I
=
tr(ρ)
2n
I
=
I
2n
(29)
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The proof shows that whatever the concrete state of ρ is , the ciphertext
getting by quantum perfect encryption is an ultimately mixed state. More
specifically, the ciphertext has nothing to do with the encrypted key with the
condition that the encyrpted key is unknown to the owner of the ciphertext.
Then we have that ρ0 =
∑
F
pFρ
0
F (s) is the ciphertext encypted by quantum
perfect encryption:
ρ0 =
∑
F
pFρ
0
F (s) =
I
2n
(30)
The quantum part of public-key is ultimately mixed state for the adver-
sary, so he cannot acquire any information about private key F = (F1, F2, F3)
by measuring such state. Moreover, according to the proposed scheme, only
one copy of each quantum public-key (s, ρ0F (s)) is allowed to be generated from
the pair of (s, F ). Thus, any two public-keys for user is different and one
private key corresponds to an exponential number of public-keys. Extracting
the value of k1, k2 and k3 by measuring is the same as attacking one-time-
pad in classical cryptography. Therefore, extracting the value of k1, k2 and
k3 is information-theoretically impossible. Furthermore, extracting the rela-
tionship between s1, s2, s3 and k1, k2, k3 are also information-theoretically
impossible.
4.2. security of the encyrption
Now, we analyze the second aspect and prove the proposed scheme has
information-theoretic security.
Proposition 1. The trace distance between any two different ciphertext
states encrypted by the same private-key is zero.
Proof. Let ρ0F (s) be the ciphertext state of message ”0” and ρ
1
F (s) be the
ciphertext state of message ”1”. ρ0F (s) and ρ
1
F (s) are both encyrpted by the
same private-key F = (F1, F2, F3). s = (s1, s2, s3) is also unchanged for
encrypting ρ0F (s) and ρ
1
F (s). For adversary, he doesn’t have private-key, the
quantum state for him is ρb =
∑
F
pFρ
b
F (s).
If the transmitted message is ”0”, the ciphertext state for the adversary
is:
1
23n
∑
k2,k3
Y ⊗k3H⊗k2
[∑
k1
(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|)
]
H⊗k2Y ⊗k3, (31)
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the ciphertext state, as demonstrated in Sec.4.1, is an ultimately mixed state:
ρ0 = I
2n
.
If the message is 1, the ciphertext state for the adversary is:
1
22n
∑
n,k2,
Y ⊗nH⊗k2
{
1
22n
∑
k1,k3
[
Y ⊗k3(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|)Y ⊗k3
]}
H⊗k2Y ⊗n(32)
The ciphertext state for the adversary is:
ρ1 =
∑
F
pFρ
1
F (s)
=
1
22n
∑
n,k2
Y ⊗nH⊗k2
{
1
22n
∑
k1,k3
[
Y ⊗k3(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|)Y ⊗k3
]}
H⊗k2Y ⊗n
=
1
22n
∑
n,k2
Y ⊗nH⊗k2ρ
′
(Y ⊗nH⊗k2)†, (33)
where
ρ
′
=
1
22n
∑
k1,k3
[
Y ⊗k3(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|)Y ⊗k3
]
. (34)
The ciphertext state for message ”1” which can be considered as a quantum
perfect encryption is also an ultimately mixed state for adversary:
ρ1 =
I
2n
. (35)
When the same private key is used to encrypt message ”0” and ”1”, the
trance distance between ρ0 and ρ1 is:
D(ρ0, ρ1) = 0 (36)
The sufficient condition of indistinguishability of two quantum states is that
the trace distance betwenn two quantum is negligible. Because ofD(ρ0, ρ1) =
0, it’s impossible for the adversary to distinguish ρ0 and ρ1.
Remark 3. Assume that adversary intercepts some ciphertext states and
attacks private-key by using {Cn} which is denoted as any quantum circuit
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family that can distinguish between ρ0 and ρ1. Quantum circuit family {Cn}
is a set of unitary transform, and the operation executed by {Cn} is linear.
Given series mixed states ρb
F 1(s), . . . , ρ
b
Fn(s) to {Cn} one by one as inputs,
equals to take ρb =
∑
F
pFρ
b
F (s) as input. The operation of summing ρ
b
F (s)
over the whole set of private-key F and the operation done by {Cn} are
commutative. That is, the following two inequality are equivalent:∣∣∣Pr[Cn(ρ0) = 1]− Pr[Cn(ρ1) = 1]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣Pr
[
Cn
(∑
F
pFρ
0
F (s)
)
= 1
]
− Pr
[
Cn
(∑
F
pFρ
1
F (s)
)
= 1
]∣∣∣∣∣
<
1
p(n)
, (37)
and ∣∣∣∣∣
∑
F
pF
{
Pr
[
Cn
(
ρ0F (s)
)
= 1
]
− Pr
[
Cn
(
ρ1F (s)
)
= 1
]}∣∣∣∣∣ < 1p(n) . (38)
Proposition 2. The trace distance between any two different ciphertext
states of the same plaintext is zero.
Proof. Let σbF (s) be the ciphertext state of message ”b” encrypted by private-
key F = (F1, F2, F3) and σ
b
F
′(s)
be the ciphertext state of message ”b” en-
cyrpted by private-key F
′
= (F
′
1, F
′
2, F
′
3). But s = (s1, s2, s3) is unchanged
for encrypting message b. For adversary, he doesn’t have private-key, the
quantum states for him are σb =
∑
F
pFσ
b
F (s) and σ
b
1 =
∑
F
′
pF ′σ
b
F
′(s)
.
If the transmitted message ”0” is encrypted by private-key F
′
= (F
′
1, F
′
2, F
′
3),
the ciphertext state for adversary is:
1
23n
∑
k
′
2,k
′
3
Y ⊗k
′
3H⊗k
′
2
[∑
k
′
1
(|0〉+ |k′1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k
′
1|)
]
H⊗k
′
2Y ⊗k
′
3. (39)
As demonstrated in Proposition 1, the above chiphertext state is an ulti-
mately mixed state which has nothing to do with k
′
1 and k
′
2.
If the transimitted message is 1 encrypted by private-key F
′
= (F
′
1, F
′
2, F
′
3),
the ciphertext state for adversary is:
1
22n
∑
n,k
′
2
Y ⊗nH⊗k
′
2
{
1
22n
∑
k
′
1,k
′
3
Y ⊗k
′
3
[
(|0〉+ |k′1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k
′
1|)Y ⊗k
′
3
]
H⊗k
′
2
}
Y ⊗n,(40)
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the ciphertext state for message ”1” is also an ultimately mixed state for
adversary.
Through above analysis, we get the equation:
D(σb, σb1) = 0 (41)
If the adversary intercepts two different ciphertext states of the same plain-
text, he is unable to distinguish them.
Remark 4. When the attacker gets np(n) variables, he can get one bit of
private-key in [12]. Considering the extreme situation, if the attacker has
acquired n−1 bis of privat-key, he guesses the last bit wrongly with probability
1
2
and will get the quantum state as bellow:
|00〉+ |11〉, (42)
and then he does Hadamard transform on the first qubit:
|00〉+ |11〉 H−→ |0〉( |0〉+ |1〉√
2
) + |1〉( |0〉 − |1〉√
2
). (43)
When measuring the state, the attacker gets the right one with probability 1
2
.
so the probability of the attacker to decide the correct last bit is 1
4
. When
attacker is lack of l bits, the probability to get the right private-key is 1
2l
+
1
2
(1− 1
2l
). Since D(σb, σb1) = 0, the attacker cannot attack successfully using
this method
5. Discussion
The proposed bit-oriented QPKE uses private key to do Hadamard trans-
form on the quantum state to hide the information about i, k1 and k2. In
[9] pointed out that if the quantum state of public-key is |i〉 + |i ⊕ k〉, the
adversary is able to extract all the information about private-key by apply-
ing only random Hadamard transform on public-key state. So the scheme
constructed in [12] took |i〉 + |i ⊕ k〉 as its public-key is insecure even in
the lower bound of private-key. The proposed scheme in this paper aims at
encrypting classical message and the public-key will be used only once to
encrypt one bit. One private-key corresponding to exponential public-keys
and one private-key can encrypt exponential classical bits.
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For encrypting one-bit, proposition 1 and 2 cannot asure that this shceme
information-theoretically secure, we also need to consider the trace distance
between
∑
F
(ρ0F )
⊗t and
∑
F
ρ1F ⊗ (ρ0F )⊗(t−1). This situation refers to that the
attack intercept t−1 public-keys as auxiliary information. For simplicity, we
consider the case
∑
F
ρ0F ⊗ ρ0F :
∑
F
ρ0F ⊗ ρ0F
=
1
2n
∑
k2
Hk2
[ 1
22n
∑
k1,k3
Y k3(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|)Y k3
⊗Y k3(|0〉+ |k1〉)(〈0|+ 〈k1|)Y k3
]
Hk2
=
1
23n−1
∑
k2
Hk2
[∑
k1,k3
(|k3, k3〉〈k3, k3|+ |k1 ⊕ k3, k3〉〈k1 ⊕ k3, k3|
+|k1 ⊕ k3, k1 ⊕ k3〉〈k3, k3|+ |k1 ⊕ k3, k3〉〈k3, k1 ⊕ k3|)
]
Hk2, (44)
Such situation is complex, so D(
∑
F
(ρ0F )
⊗t,
∑
F
ρ1F ⊗ (ρ0F )⊗(t−1)) may not be
effective computed.
The premise of the bit-oriented QPKE is that the quantum key distribu-
tion is secure, therefore we concentrate in the study of QPKE. However, how
to ensure the quantum key is distributed securely is an important problem
which worth the effort to research on.
Classical PKE relies on one-way function. one-way function [18] is based
on computational complexity hypothesis. It is a function that it is easy to
compute f(x) for every x in the domain of f , but the reverse calculation is
difficult. More specifically, for all y in the range of f , it’s hard to find x
satisfies y = f(x) in expected polynomial time. We wonder whether QPKE
is also based on one-way function, and what’s the one-way property of QPKE
under the assurance of quantum mechanics.
CCA1, CCA2 and semantically secure are all concerned about the security
of classical PKE. The quantum counterparts of these also needs to be further
developed.
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6. Conclusions
This paper studies bit-oriented quantum public-key encryption. The
features of our scheme is: (1) private-key is Boolean function, (2) public-
key is a pair of classical string and quantum state, (3) one private-key
corresponds to an exponential number of public-keys, (4) this scheme en-
sures information-theoretically security. We analyze the proposed QPKE is
information-theoretically secure if every private-key used o(n) times and the
security with the cases including attack to the privat-key and attack to the
encryption.
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